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11 
Reforming Family Court: Getting It Right between 
Rhetoric and Reality  
Jane M. Spinak  
INTRODUCTION 
Last fall I was asked by the New York Law Journal, New York 
State‘s daily law newspaper, to comment on Chief Judge Judith S. 
Kaye‘s success at reforming family court. Judge Kaye was retiring 
after a long tenure as the Chief Judge of New York‘s highest court, a 
role that includes administering the state court system. In that 
administrative capacity, she had been an ardent instigator of a range 
of family court reforms begun in earnest in the mid-1990s. The 
central goal of the reform effort was to create a Family Division of 
the New York State Supreme Court—the trial court of general 
jurisdiction in New York—by merging the Family Court into the 
Supreme Court to expand the jurisdictional authority of Family Court 
judges and distribute resources more fairly throughout the court 
system.
1
 Anticipating political barriers to court merger, Judge Kaye‘s 
 
  Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. The basis for 
this Article was my keynote address for the Washington University School of Law Ninth 
Annual Access to Equal Justice Conference, sponsored by the Clinical Education Program, held 
on Friday, March 27, 2009. The title of the talk was chosen before I came across a 1982 
publication that also highlighted the tension between rhetoric and reality in evaluating 
government operations. See JOE N. KAY & PEG KAY, GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT AND 
EVALUABILITY ASSESSMENT 75–85 (1982). An earlier version of the talk was presented at the 
New York Law School Clinical Theory Workshop in February 2009. I am grateful to Stephen 
Ellmann, who chairs this wonderful workshop, and to the colleagues who provided such 
excellent critiques. The Columbia Law School Faculty Research Fund provided financial 
support. Much of the analysis of the 2007 Synthesis of the 2005 Court Improvement Program 
Reform and Activities Final Report and other court improvement project reports was done by 
Diana Kane, Yale Law School 2011 J.D. Candidate, whose dedication to uncovering the real 
meaning of these reports was extraordinary and unrelenting. This Article draws on the 
scholarship and inspiration of two Columbians, both of whom died before this work was done. 
My thanks to Charles Tilly and Alfred Kahn for leading the way and keeping us honest.  
 1. Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The Potential of Model Family Courts, 
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reform agenda included a variety of measures that could be achieved 
through administrative actions, thus bypassing some controversial 
political decision-making.
2
 At the same time that Judge Kaye was 
working to change New York‘s Family Court, she was highlighting 
the work of family courts on the national stage. As Chair of the 
Conference of Chief Justices, she shepherded a resolution 
establishing a ―Statement of Principles Regarding Children and 
Families,‖ which urged that children and family issues be given the 
highest priority in state court systems.
3
 Family court reform is central 
to Judge Kaye‘s legacy.  
So, when the New York Law Journal reporter called for my 
opinion, I faced a dilemma. On the one hand, I wanted to give Judge 
Kaye credit for her deep commitment to reforming family court;
4
 on 
the other hand, I had to ask myself who was to blame—including 
perhaps Judge Kaye herself—for failing to achieve significant reform 
despite enormous effort. In the aftermath of struggling to answer the 
reporter‘s questions, I began to tie together some of the questions I 
would like to explore: What do we say about the reform work we do, 
and to what degree is what we say accurate? How does the way in 
which we talk about family court reform implicate our analysis of 
what we are achieving? How does our place or role within the system 
affect our perceptions of reform? What limits our willingness and 
ability to apply rigorous evaluative techniques to determine whether 
we are reaching our goals? And if we are failing, can we 
acknowledge failure and learn from it? Answering these questions 
may lead to a better understanding of why family court reform is 
 
2002 WISC. L. REV. 331, 350 (2002).  
 2. Thomas W. Church & Brian J. Nickerson, New York’s Courts, in GOVERNING NEW 
YORK STATE 181–82 (Jeffrey M. Stonecase ed., 4th ed. 2001). See also MARC BLOUSTEIN, A 
SHORT HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STATE COURT SYSTEM 15, available at http://www.courts. 
state.ny.us/history/pdf/Library/History/Short_History_of_NY_Court_System.pdf. 
 3. Resolution 21: Statements of Principles Regarding Children and Families (2001), 
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/ChildWelfareResolutions/resol21KidsStatement.html. 
 4. The other chief judge who is credited for her significant commitment to children‘s 
issues is the Honorable Kathleen A. Blatz (retired) of Minnesota. See Kathleen Blatz Resigns 
from Minnesota Supreme Court, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO, Sept. 29, 2005, http://news. 
minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/09/29_stawickie_blatzresigns/; see also Failure to 
Protect: A National Dialogue on Child Welfare (PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2003), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/symposium/.  
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stuck between rhetoric and reality. Before I address these questions, I 
will provide a brief background on family court. 
I. FAMILY COURT 
A. Historical Context 
Family court was one of several great public institutions 
established by American social reformers around the turn of the 
twentieth century to address the burgeoning complexity of societal 
issues in an increasingly urban environment. Family courts, still 
known as juvenile, dependency, domestic relations, or children‘s 
courts, began as an alternative to adult criminal court for children in 
trouble with the law but quickly expanded to include multiple areas 
of jurisdiction, including delinquency; child welfare; child support 
and paternity; status offenses; family offenses; divorce; custody and 
visitation; guardianship; and adoption.
5
 The creators of family courts 
had imagined a court where informality, specially trained public 
servants, such as probation officers and social workers, and a kindly 
judge would work together to provide benign but effective assistance 
to children and families. By mid-century, however, a new generation 
of reformers was lamenting the family court‘s failures: inappropriate 
state intervention into family decision-making, inadequate services to 
support families, untrained and under-resourced social service 
systems, children placed in dangerous and inappropriate institutions, 
and court proceedings that failed to provide even a semblance of due 
process.
6
  
 State and federal courts, including the United States Supreme 
Court, began to issue decisions more clearly defining the rights and 
roles of parents and children. These decisions addressed conditions of 
care and established basic procedural due process rights for litigants, 
including the right to counsel for children in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings and stricter evidentiary standards in certain child welfare 
 
 5. Jane M. Spinak, The Family Court, in THE CHILD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC COMPANION 
344, 344 (Richard A. Shweder ed., 2009). 
 6. Id. at 345. See, e.g., ALFRED J. KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN 3–8 (1953). 
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proceedings.
7
 During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the 
federal government passed a series of laws to increase its oversight of 
state systems of child welfare, juvenile delinquency, foster care, and 
adoption.
8
  
This is the family court in which I began to practice. The idea of 
the court as a kindly intervener was at a low ebb, and the due process 
paradigm presented an alluring vision to improve the court.
9
 
Nevertheless, the core idea that family court can assist families to 
solve their problems remained intact. As the century drew to an end 
and the procedural reforms that earlier had been heralded remained 
unrealized, the court as a problem solver began to reemerge.
10
 The 
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges has 
spearheaded a ―model court‖ project intended to reinvigorate the 
family court as a place where a team of professionals led by the judge 
can provide a range of assistance and services for complex familial 
needs.
11
 In short, the court serves as a place for families to get help. I 
do not believe in this helping premise. People come to the family 
court either because they have to—a youth has been charged with a 
crime or a parent with mistreating his children or not paying child 
support—or because the court is the only or last remaining place to 
address their unresolved custody, visitation, domestic violence, or 
 
 7. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding a state statute allowing 
the state to permanently terminate a parent‘s interest in her child unconstitutional as a 
deprivation of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that juveniles charged in delinquency 
proceedings are granted many of the due process rights adults are granted).  
 8. Child Welfare Information Gateway, Major Federal Legislation Concerned with 
Child Protection, Child Welfare, and Adoption (2009), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/ 
otherpubs/majorfedlegis.cfm (outlining child protective, foster care, and adoption legislative 
history); Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Legislation, http://www. 
childwelfare.gov/pubs/otherpubs/majorfedlegis.cfm (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) (reporting 
juvenile delinquency legislative history). 
 9. BARRY C. FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 8–18 (2d ed. 2003). 
 10. This reemergence parallels the development at the end of the twentieth century of the 
criminal drug court movement, which generally offers non-violent, drug-addicted offenders the 
alternative of court-ordered drug treatment to imprisonment through a ―team‖ model in which 
the district attorney, defense counsel, judge, and treatment providers work together toward the 
goal of the defendant's sobriety and lawful behavior. Spinak, Adding Value to Families, supra 
note 1, at 351.  
 11. See id. at 352–53; National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Frequently 
Asked Questions about National Council Model Courts, http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/ 
blogcategory/117/156/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
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paternity issues. If these families could resolve disputes themselves 
or receive readily available and appropriately crafted assistance to 
address their problems, they would come to court only when they 
needed a legal judgment.
12
 But whether families come for general 
help or a legally binding decision, they currently get neither. 
Throughout the country, family courts have become clogged with 
cases that take months or years to reach resolution.
13
 Many people 
respond that this is because the courts are overcrowded and under-
resourced—and they may be right. Family courts always are going to 
have too many cases and too few resources. This forever has been 
and forever will be true.
14
 But we cannot wait for resources to address 
 
 12. Anne H. Geraghty & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Unified Family Courts: Tempering 
Enthusiasm with Caution, 40 FAM. CT. REV 435, 440–41 (2002); Jane M. Spinak, Romancing 
the Court, 46 FAM. CT. REV 258, 264 (2008). Two accounts written for the twenty-fifth 
anniversary commemoration of the founding of the juvenile court advocate using the court only 
as a last resort. Charles W. Hoffman, Organization of Family Courts, with Special Reference to 
the Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT 255, 260 (Jane Addams ed., 
1925) (recognizing that preventive action within the community would diminish the need for 
court intervention); Julian W. Mack, The Chancery Procedure in the Juvenile Court, in THE 
CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT, supra at 310, 317–18. Mack‘s account looked specifically 
at delinquency questions, declaring:  
It is the last thing to do with the wayward child to bring him into any court. The wise 
probation officer will save him from the court, will endeavor to make the adjustment in 
the family, just as the wise parent will keep the difficulty to himself as long as he can, 
dealing directly with his child and not bring in any outsider. 
Id. Judge Mack further recognized society‘s need to acknowledge the cause of court 
intervention when he added:  
The fundamental duty of society is to prevent that child from going wrong; the 
fundamental duty of society is to recognize the causes that lead to the wrongdoing. The 
fundamental duty of society is to see what the economic basis is that brings the 
children into court and correct the economic wrong. Tear down your hovels and your 
slums. Give your working man the leisure by enforced limitation of hours of work to 
give thought to the raising of his own family before you step in and say he is not 
competent to deal with his own children. 
Id.  
 13. Emily Wall, Finding a Right to a Speedy Trial in Child Welfare Cases: Recognizing 
the Value of Time 23–29 (2009) (detailing the range of reasons why family court cases, 
especially child protective cases, are delayed) (unpublished note, on file with author). 
 14. Spinak, Adding Value to Families, supra note 1, at 339 n.42 (citing Harry N. Scheiber, 
Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A History of Judicial Reform and the California Courts, 
1960–1990, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2049, 2052 (1993)). Inadequate resources contribute to any 
discussion about court reform. In 1954, in CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW 
YORK CITY: A REPORT BY A SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK AND A STUDY BY WALTER GELLHORN ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAWS 
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reform. We must instead begin focusing on the following questions: 
Why are these cases in court at all? Why do child protective agencies 
and juvenile prosecutors flood courts with cases? Why do we use 
courts as ongoing arbiters in family disputes?  
B. The Problem-Solving Reform Paradigm and the Value-Added 
Reform Paradigm 
My answers to these questions differ from those of the architects 
of current family court reform efforts, who have re-embraced the 
court as a problem-solving system. Most reform efforts have 
expanded the court‘s jurisdiction and supervisory authority in recent 
years, heralding the family court judge as the leader of a team of 
professionals who are solving the problems of families that come to 
court.
15
 The ―one family/one judge‖ movement consolidates a 
family‘s cases before one judge so that the judge can use her 
leadership to address the family‘s needs more holistically.16 The 
acceleration of specialized problem-solving courts within the family 
court, such as family drug treatment, similarly focuses on the judge‘s 
leadership role to create and monitor solutions to families‘ 
problems.
17
 These problem-solving efforts are expressions of deep 
 
RELATING TO THE FAMILY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 7, 391 (1954), the authors noted the 
inadequacy of auxiliary services, facilities, and salaries for the court to function. The authors 
acknowledged that, without additional resources, other proposed reforms would not succeed. 
Almost fifty years later, Judge Kaye‘s first systemic reform plan for Family Court noted 
overwhelming caseloads, inadequate resources, and large numbers of litigants without lawyers 
as barriers to reform. See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., FAMILY JUSTICE PROGRAM PHASE 
III 1 (2001) (on file with author). 
 15. Judge Leonard P. Edwards is among the foremost proponents of the problem-solving 
court movement. On receiving the William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence, one of 
the highest judicial honors in the country, Judge Edwards celebrated the juvenile court as ―the 
original problem-solving court,‖ noting that the family court judge is ―an administrator, a 
collaborator, a convener, and an advocate.‖ Remarks of Judge Leonard P. Edwards at the 
Presentation of the William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence, U.S. Supreme Court, 
Washington, D.C., November 18, 2004, in J. CTR. FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 169, 170, 172 
(2004). 
 16. Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in 
Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 469, 527 
(1998). For a simple explanation of ―one family, one judge‖ see Access to Justice, One Family 
One Judge, http://a2j.kentlaw.edu/A2J/system_design/Resolution/onef_onej.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2009).  
 17. Spinak, Romancing the Court, supra note 12, at 262–63, 269–71. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/3
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concern for the people who use family court and come from strongly 
held beliefs that these efforts will work. I hold equally strong beliefs 
that they will not. Rather, I believe that the court‘s role is far more 
limited as a court of law.  
Experience and research has led me to believe that if the state is 
going to intervene in families‘ lives via judicial proceedings, the 
court must add value to the intervention beyond what a social service, 
child welfare, or probation agency can provide. That value or purpose 
is protection of the family‘s substantive due process right of ―family 
integrity.‖ The court‘s role is to protect both parents‘ right to raise 
their children as they choose and children‘s right to grow up with 
their families.
18
 The United States Constitution prohibits states from 
intervening in family life without establishing that a family is unable 
to protect a child from harm, neglect, abuse, or trouble.
19
 If the family 
affirmatively seeks the assistance of the court, these requests must 
not automatically trigger additional court intervention without clear 
proof of harm. For example, when a woman seeks an order of 
protection in a domestic violence crisis, the court cannot interfere 
with her role as a mother without evidence of parental unfitness.
20
 
 
 18. In its most recent reaffirmation of family integrity, the Supreme Court concluded: ―In 
light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning 
the care, custody, and control of their children.‖ Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). In 
his dissent, Justice Stevens noted that, while the Court has yet to determine a child‘s liberty 
interest in his or her family bonds (including those beyond a parent), ―it seems . . . extremely 
likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving 
such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their 
interests be balanced in the equation.‖ Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Such an interest was 
found recently by a federal district court in Kenny A. v. Perdue, where the court stated: 
[C]hildren have fundamental liberty interests at stake in deprivation and TPR 
proceedings. These include a child‘s interest in his or her own safety, health, and well-
being, as well as an interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit and in 
having a relationship with his or her biological parents. 
Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2005). 
 19. The state nevertheless maintains its parens patriae responsibilities, which requires 
adult caretakers of children, including parents, to comply with laws that serve to protect the 
health and safety of both the children and society in general. SARAH H. RAMSEY & DOUGLAS E. 
ABRAMS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW 14–17 (3d ed. 2007). 
 20. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 371–72 (N.Y. 2004). In Nicholson, the 
Court of Appeals of New York held: 
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Similarly, unless a legally defined harm can be established, the court 
cannot function as a problem solver no matter what positive 
consequence results.
21
 The disproportionate representation of poor 
families and families of color in family court heightens my concern.
22
 
Our desire to ―help‖ these families in particular—not through 
comprehensive medical, educational, and social welfare policies, but 
through the coercive power of a court—should make court 
intervention a last resort.
23
  
This ―value added‖ paradigm does not reflect the current family 
court reform movement, which heralds the court as a problem solver. 
 
 Only when a petitioner demonstrates, by a preponderance of evidence, that both 
elements [the impairment or imminent impairment of a child‘s physical, mental, or 
emotional condition, and that the actual or threatened harm is the result of the parents 
or caretaker failing to exercise a minimum degree of care] of section 1012 (f) [of the 
New York Family Court Act] are satisfied may a child be deemed neglected under the 
statute. When ―the sole allegation‖ is that the mother has been abused and the child has 
witnessed the abuse, such a showing has not been made. . . .  
. . . . 
 In such circumstances, the battered mother is charged with neglect not because she 
is a victim of domestic violence or because her children witnessed the abuse, but rather 
because a preponderance of the evidence establishes that the children were actually or 
imminently harmed by reason of her failure to exercise even minimal care in providing 
them with proper oversight. 
Id. The court stated simply that ―more is required for a showing of neglect under New York law 
than the fact that a child was exposed to domestic abuse against the caretaker.‖ Id. at 368. 
 21. See Edward P. Mulvey, Family Courts: The Issue of Reasonable Goals, 6 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 49, 56–57 (1982).  
 22. A comprehensive synthesis of minority disproportionality studies in child welfare and 
related systems highlights the need for a more nuanced and rigorous research agenda in order to 
better inform policy decisions while nevertheless confirming both the overrepresentation of 
minority children in child welfare and the disparate treatment within child welfare that minority 
children receive. Robert B. Hill, Disproportionality of Minorities in Child Welfare: Synthesis of 
Research Findings, http://www.racemattersconsortium.org/docs/whopaper4.pdf. See also 
ROBERT B. HILL, AN ANALYSIS OF RACIAL/ETHNIC DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY AT 
THE NATIONAL, STATE, AND COUNTY LEVELS 1–2 (2007), http://www.racemattersconsortium. 
org/docs/BobHillNCANDS&AFCARS.pdf.  
 23. The United States is not the child-loving society that it makes itself out to be. As 
Martin Guggenheim discusses, the U.S. has the highest child-poverty rate among industrial 
nations, ranks sixteenth in the world for standard of living among the poorest one-fifth of 
children, has more than twelve million children living below the poverty line (almost seventeen 
percent of all children), and has staggering rates of child mortality, lead poisoning, asthma, 
homelessness, and lack of health insurance. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT‘S WRONG WITH 
CHILDREN‘S RIGHTS 196–98 (2005). Guggenheim discusses this point in the context of the 
correlation between out-of-home placements and poverty. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/3
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First, I want to examine whether the problem-solving movement is 
achieving its own goals before positing whether the ―value added‖ 
paradigm can be similarly held accountable.  
II. ANALYZING THE PROBLEM-SOLVING REFORM PARADIGM 
A. The Rhetoric of Reform 
A great scholar of family court, Alfred J. Kahn, recently passed 
away at the age of ninety. His New York Times obituary noted an 
apprehension expressed earlier in life: ―I represent a concern for what 
is being accomplished, rather than what is being done. ‗Services 
rendered‘ are not enough. I want to know what‘s going on.‖24 
Inheriting Professor Kahn‘s concern, I ask what is being 
accomplished by these problem-solving court reforms. To answer 
that question, this Article first examines the way the reforms are 
described, because the rhetoric
25
 concerning a significant portion of 
reform efforts masks both the complexity of the problems being faced 
and the actual outcomes.  
The rhetoric used to describe current family court reform has been 
persuasive because the reformers use stories, a most enduring form of 
human communication. But storytelling can be reductive, especially 
if it is relied on to convey factual analysis rather than conceptual 
ideas. I focus first on this form of rhetoric before turning to the 
equally disturbing conclusion that the information being conveyed so 
persuasively in these stories and in the supposedly more objective 
reports about family court reform may reflect more about who we are 
than what we are—or are not—accomplishing.  
Stories simplify complexity; they are told to communicate a point, 
to render the conveyed ideas more accessible to an audience. The 
central story told in this Article is that we need to be very careful 
about heralding courts as problem solvers without sufficient proof of 
their problem-solving abilities. The late Charles Tilly, one of the 
 
 24. William Grimes, Alfred J. Kahn, 90, Expert in the Welfare of Children, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 21, 2009, at A33. 
 25. This Article uses the word rhetoric in its classic definition: persuasive speech or 
writing. 
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great sociologists and political scientists of the second half of the 
twentieth century, said stories make the world intelligible and 
simplify experience.
26
 In his view, stories rework the relationships of 
social life, sorting through and shifting responsibilities, lending 
themselves to moral evaluations of people and actions.
27
 But Tilly 
warned that stories mask the complex webs of cause and effect that 
allow us to distribute credit and blame and thereby accurately 
determine responsibility.
28
 Success is the most common story in the 
rhetoric attached to the promotion of family court as a problem-
solving court. When Judge Kaye speaks or writes about the family 
drug treatment courts created as part of her family court reform 
efforts in New York, she invariably tells a story about one of the 
treatment court‘s graduates who has overcome her substance abuse, 
been reunited with her children, and is moving forward with her life 
in remarkable ways. These wonderful success stories are repeated 
around the country in problem-solving family courts, criminal drug 
courts, and mental health courts. Richard Nolan, in his discerning 
critique of criminal drug courts, Reinventing Justice, called narrative 
the ―defining feature‖ of criminal drug courts.29 In fact, he describes 
these courts as ―drug court theater.‖30  
The touching stories of court participants—the professionals as 
well as the litigants—elevate emotion above the proven viability of 
the venture.
31
 Dr. Henry Steadman, who studies the effectiveness of 
criminal mental health courts, warns that these anecdotes are so 
emotionally powerful that they can blind us from conducting rational 
critiques.
32
 The stories that pull at our heartstrings are not false; they 
are just incomplete. They do not tell us about the mother who failed 
to complete the court program, the woman who returned to her 
abusive spouse, or the defendant who was sent to the wrong 
 
 26. CHARLES TILLY, CREDIT AND BLAME 20 (2008). 
 27. Id. at 21. 
 28. Id. at 20–21, 39. 
 29. JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT 
MOVEMENT 111 (2001). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 111–13. 
 32. Henry J. Steadman, President, Policy Research Assocs., Speech at Columbia Law 
School: The Phenomenon of U.S. Mental Health Courts: Dissynchronicity of Practice and Data 
(Dec. 3, 2008). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/3
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treatment. Nor do they tell us how many people began the program 
and failed. These shortcomings elicit the following questions: Were 
those who succeeded more likely to succeed than other participants? 
What were the measurements of success or failure? Can success 
occur only on a very small scale, or can it change the way the entire 
system works?
33
 In short, the stories do not provide methods with 
which to measure the effectiveness of the reforms. As Tilly tells us, 
―narrative is the friend of communication, the enemy of 
explanation.‖34  
Why do we cling to these stories rather than the systematic 
analysis that may provide more effective reform? The answer, in part, 
is found in the scholarship of those disciplines that try to explain our 
decision-making processes in order to uncover the way we interact 
with each other as individuals and as part of complex organizations.
35
 
If we apply the lessons of these disciplines to family court reform 
efforts, we can begin to answer the questions this Article initially 
posed.  
My first question was whether the way we talk about family court 
reform implicates our analysis of what we are achieving. I already 
have discussed this in the context of storytelling, but further 
discussion is warranted. I sit on the New York County Lawyers 
Association Task Force on the Future of Family Court in New York 
City, a task force created to help reform New York City‘s Family 
Court. One member of the task force regularly calls for the 
abolishment of family court. Despite widespread agreement of task 
force members that the court is broken, few members agree that the 
 
 33. For a discussion of the difficulty of answering these questions without careful study, 
see JUVENILE DRUG COURTS AND TEEN SUBSTANCE ABUSE (Jeffrey A. Butts & John Roman 
eds., 2004). 
 34. CHARLES TILLY, ROADS FROM PAST TO FUTURE 7 (1997). 
 35. For this Article, I have drawn only on a small number of authors and scholars who are 
concerned with how individuals and organizations make decisions that influence their own lives 
as well as broader societal policies and practices. Malcolm Gladwell‘s books The Tipping Point 
(2000) and Blink (2005) have gained popular attention along with Cass Sunstein and Richard 
Thaler‘s recent book Nudge (2008). The Project on Law and Mind Sciences at Harvard Law 
School has a website for ―scholars, students, and citizens with an interest in understanding the 
implications of social psychology, social cognition, and other related mind sciences for law, 
policymaking, and legal theory.‖ The Project on Law and Mind Sciences at Harvard Law 
School, http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k13943&pageid=icb.page63708 (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 31:11 
 
 
court should be eliminated altogether. Social psychology gives us 
some guidance as to why most of the task force members want the 
family court to continue.  
B. Family Court as a Powerful Idea 
Family court is a powerful idea that has been part of our legal 
consciousness for over one hundred years. Our emotional attachment 
to ideas is a central component to resisting change. Psychologist and 
Harvard cognition and education scholar Howard Gardner points out 
that this emotional attachment, compounded by a public commitment 
to a particular idea, is among the key elements to resisting change.
36
 
Moreover, if the idea is embedded in a powerful story, its ability to 
survive in our consciousness is heightened.
37
 A court that cares—a 
court that does not use the weapons of litigation to destroy but uses 
benign help to restore—is a powerful story. Even Justice Blackmun, 
struggling to decide whether a juvenile should have a right to a jury 
trial, rejected that due process right because it would destroy the very 
idea of juvenile court.
38
 He said, ―Perhaps that ultimate 
disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are 
disinclined to give impetus to it.‖ Instead, we reformulate the idea in 
ways that are both recognizable and limited. Problem-solving courts, 
judicial leadership, and team efforts are not modern reform concepts, 
but familiar and thus comfortable reincarnations of the powerful idea 
of a family court. They ―satisfice‖ us, as Nobel laureate Herbert 
Simon said, allowing us to settle for an outcome that falls within an 
acceptable zone rather than maximizing our options.
39
  
Our inclination to hold on to this powerful idea even as we try to 
reform it is reinforced by what sociologists identify as change 
occurring only at the edges of customary patterns.
40
 We innovate in 
 
 36. HOWARD GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF CHANGING OUR 
OWN AND OTHER PEOPLE‘S MINDS 57 (2004).  
 37. See id. at 72–73. 
 38. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971). 
 39. TILLY, ROADS FROM PAST TO FUTURE, supra note 34, at 39 (citing HERBERT SIMON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1976); HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MY LIFE (1991)). 
For additional definitions of ―satisfice,‖ see Arnold Keller, Professional Writing 408, 
http://web.uvic.ca/akeller/pw408/r_satisfice.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
 40. See TILLY, ROADS FROM PAST TO FUTURE, supra note 34, at 45. 
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ways that firmly connect us to established practices.
41
 The discomfort 
associated with the idea of abolishing family court is less palpable 
when it is discussed as a ―merger‖ rather than an ―abolition,‖ even if 
either measure accomplishes the same goal. 
C. Framing Reform 
Reforms are further limited by the way they are framed.
42
 In 
family court reform, we begin invariably with the goal of making the 
court more efficient.
43
 This generally is met by a proposal for more 
resources: more judges, more lawyers, more everything. This is a 
comfortable convention to explain family court‘s problems.44 Even if 
there is some disagreement as to where court reform money should 
be spent, obtaining more money almost universally is seen as 
necessary to reform the court. While the frame of resources—or the 
lack thereof—fits our conventional understanding of what is wrong, 
this framework blinds us from considering alternative solutions. And 
then, if resources disappear, we have not created sustainable reform.
45
 
For example, New York State recently set a cap on the number of 
 
 41. Id. at 41. 
 42. Consider Erving Goffman‘s definition of ―framing‖:  
 My aim is to try to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available 
in our society for making sense out of events and to analyze the special vulnerabilities 
to which these frames of reference are subject. I start with the fact that from an 
individual‘s particular point of view, while one thing may momentarily appear to be 
what is really going on, in fact what is actually happening is plainly [something else] 
. . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles 
of organization which govern events—at least social ones—and our subjective 
involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as 
I am able to identify. That is my definition of frame. My phrase ―frame analysis‖ is a 
slogan to refer to the examination in these terms of the organization of experience. 
ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS 10–11 (1974). 
 43. Spinak, Adding Value to Families, supra note 1, at 359.  
 44. Tilly notes that conventions ―mark boundaries between insiders and outsiders . . . and 
convey accumulated ideas from one generation to the next.‖ CHARLES TILLY, WHY? 34 (2006). 
Blaming a ―lack of resources‖ comforts Family Court players by placing blame on a problem 
for which they are not responsible, diminishing the necessity of searching for other causes that 
may disrupt insider relationships.  
 45. See GARDNER, supra note 36, at 17. 
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cases that children‘s lawyers handling child protective and 
delinquency cases may work at one time.
46
 This reform was hailed as 
a major accomplishment. For many years, child advocates had 
lamented their inability to represent their clients effectively because 
of their heavy caseloads.
47
 In the mid-1990s I ran the Juvenile Rights 
Division of the Legal Aid Society, which represents most of the 
children subject to the child welfare and delinquency systems in New 
York City. Each of my budget requests to the state sought more 
money to hire more lawyers in order to lighten lawyer caseloads. But 
even as I wrote those budget requests, I knew caseload management 
skills among the lawyers varied. Some lawyers could manage high 
caseloads well; some could not. Some were willing to learn 
innovative case management techniques; some were not. Some were 
able to draw on creative resources; some were not. But focusing on 
the numbers alone masked deeper problems in our practice and 
conveniently allowed us to frame most issues in terms of resources.  
The anticipated consequence of the law limiting cases is that 
children will receive better representation. With more time, the 
lawyers will learn new skills, try different strategies, become better at 
their jobs, and be less traumatized by the work. But there may be one 
or more unanticipated consequences, including that the representation 
will be easier but not better, that the outcomes for children may not 
improve, or that the reform fails to consider the impact on the rest of 
the court system.
48
 To thwart these potential consequences, we should 
embrace the opportunity the resources provide to examine and 
improve the way lawyers practice, by purposely framing the issue as 
something more than resources.  
Consider an example of an alternative reform framework. Our 
reform efforts rarely include the opinions of litigants, though 
 
 46. Joel Stashenko, Law Guardian Cases are Capped at 150, 239 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Apr. 2, 
2008). 
 47. Caseload caps have garnered national attention and support. An important national 
gathering of child and family advocates resulted in a series of recommendations, including 
―strict caseload limits, and for attorneys representing children, caseloads limits should be based 
on the number of clients, rather than the number of cases.‖ Recommendations of the UNLV 
Conference on Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years after 
Fordham: Introduction, 6 NEV. L.J. 592, 599 (2006).  
 48. See Jane M. Spinak, The Role of Strategic Management Planning in Improving the 
Representation of Clients: A Child Advocacy Example, 34 FAM. L.Q. 497, 501 (2000). 
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occasionally there is representation on a board or committee, and 
sometimes community-based peer advocates attend public forums to 
voice their concerns.
49
 Reformers might consider emphasizing in 
particular what the litigants seek from participation in family court. 
In the last several years, adolescents in foster care have spoken and 
written extensively about their desire to participate in the court 
proceedings affecting their lives. Their voices—and their very 
effective arguments for participation—have begun to change youth 
participation across the country.
50
 Justifications for keeping youth out 
of court—that youth would be harmed by the information, hearings 
would take too long, youth would miss school, youth would not 
understand what is going on—were countered by the youths‘ 
incredibly persuasive responses to these rationales which can be 
summed up principally: the court is making decisions about our lives, 
and we want to be there when those decisions are made.
51
 Yet, many 
court professionals remain skeptical about youth participation. I fear 
that their real motivation for not wanting youth present is the fear of 
exposing what we fail to accomplish on their behalf. Greater 
transparency might require us to conduct our business very 
differently.  
III. USING SYSTEMATIC KNOWLEDGE TO ANALYZE REFORM 
Even if we were prepared to frame our questions differently, to 
move beyond conventional reasons for our actions, and to analyze the 
 
 49. See, e.g., Child Welfare Organizing Project, CWOP‘s Core Activities, http://www. 
cwop.org/activities_core.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
 50. For example, in California, children ten years and older have had a right to attend their 
family court proceedings since 2007. California Youth Connection, Legislation, http://www. 
calyouthconn.org/site/cyc/section.php?id=19 (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). This change was 
spearheaded by foster care youth and their advocates. See id. For information about a similar 
youth advocacy group and its recommendations, see YOUTH JUSTICE BOARD, STAND UP STAND 
OUT: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN NEW YORK CITY'S 
PERMANENCY PLANNING PROCESS, available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/ 
documents/YJBreport%20final_2007.pdf.  
 51. See Erik S. Pitchal, Where Are All the Children? Increasing Youth Participation in 
Dependency Proceedings, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL‘Y 233, 245–46 (2008); see also 
Theresa Hughes, A Paradigm of Youth Client Satisfaction: Heightening Professional 
Responsibility for Children’s Advocates, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 551 (2007) (discussing 
the positive correlation between youth satisfaction of their legal representation and their 
participation in the legal proceedings). 
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stories on which we have relied, we have yet another step to take. We 
must be willing to hold ourselves accountable for our efforts, to 
analyze critically whether we are accomplishing our goals.
52
 Thus far, 
we have not required ourselves to erect a system of accountability 
grounded in what social scientists call ―systematic knowledge.‖53 
In Roads from Past to Future, Tilly says that ―[s]ystematic 
knowledge . . . consists of explanations for phenomena that more than 
one individual can observe, explanations that transfer logically and 
correctly from one situation to another.‖54 Systematic knowledge uses 
scientific processes that, according to social psychologists Carol 
Tavris and Elliot Aronson, force us ―to confront our self-justifications 
and put them on public display for others to puncture.‖55 This is hard 
for any of us to do, especially if we have a professional expertise and 
identity to present to the world.
56
 In their book Mistakes Were Made 
(but Not by Me), Tavris and Aronson discuss the reluctance to be 
self-critical in analyzing how so many mental health professionals 
mistakenly came to believe in recovered memories in the 1980s.
57
 
They point out that even those practitioners steeped in scientific 
method lost their ability ―not to be fooled and not to fool anyone 
else.‖58 These experts lost the essential skepticism that makes each of 
us consider whether we might be wrong or headed down the wrong 
path. But even properly applied social science is fallible. 
Nonetheless, I agree with Tilly when he says ―[s]ystematic 
knowledge often fails, but it fails less often than common sense or 
 
 52. See Jane M. Spinak, Foreword: Framing Family Court through the Lens of 
Accountability, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 431, 436–38 (2007) (discussing the 
recommendation of Professor J. Lawrence Aber to participants in a family court conference to 
develop rigorous accountability measures to determine whether the family court is achieving its 
goals).  
 53. See infra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. The most significant effort to analyze 
family court effectiveness and workload measures is the model proposed in AM. BAR ASS‘N 
CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE LAW ET AL., BUILDING A BETTER COURT: MEASURING AND 
IMPROVING COURT PERFORMANCE AND JUDICIAL WORKLOAD IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
CASES (2004), http://www.ncjfcj. org/images/stories/dept/ppcd/pdf/buildingabetterrecord.pdf.  
 54. TILLY, ROADS FROM PAST TO FUTURE, supra note 34, at 30. 
 55. CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY 
WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS 108 (2007). 
 56. Id. at 30–31. 
 57. Id. at 106. 
 58. Id. (quoting Paul Meehl, Psychology: Does Our Heterogeneous Subject Matter Have 
Any Unity?, MINN. PSYCHOLOGIST 4 (1986)). 
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conventional wisdom.‖59 In the realm of family court reform, 
common sense, lack of skepticism, and traditional framing have 
limited the ability to objectively examine the effectiveness of our 
reform efforts. For fifteen years we have been engaged in a 
nationwide effort to reform family court without bringing to that 
reform a critical eye.  
A. Court Improvement Project Reform Efforts 
Since 1993, the federal Children‘s Bureau of the Administration 
for Children and Families has provided Court Improvement Project 
(CIP) funding to states in an effort to improve child welfare services 
throughout the country.
60
 The funding initially provided ―grants to 
State court systems to conduct assessments of their foster care and 
adoption laws and judicial processes, and to develop and implement a 
plan for system improvement.‖61 These initial assessments allowed 
states to identify those places in law and practice where improving 
the court system could result in overall improvements in child 
welfare systems throughout the state.
62
 This initial assessment was a 
wake-up call for many states about the inadequacies of the way their 
court systems dealt with child welfare issues.
63
  
1. CIP Studies 
To determine how initial CIP funding was being used, the 
Children‘s Bureau commissioned a 1999 study of CIP efforts.64 The 
authors of the study acknowledged that the CIP program was too 
young and the efforts too new and varied to apply rigorous analytical 
standards to the reforms.
65
 Rather, they applauded the willingness of 
states to assess their own laws and practices and to begin to address 
 
 59. TILLY, ROADS FROM PAST TO FUTURE, supra note 34, at 30. 
 60. Admin. for Children & Families, Court Improvement Program (2009), http://www.acf. 
hhs.gov/programs/cb/programs_fund/state_tribal/ct_imprv.htm. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. JAMES BELL ASSOCS., REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF STATE PROGRAM REPORTS 
RELATED TO THE COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM 12–15 (1999) [hereinafter ―Bell 1999‖]. 
 64. See id. at iv. 
 65. Id. at 10, 20–23. 
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the issues they identified as problematic.
66
 In particular the study 
noted that CIP efforts seemed to be a catalyst for getting disparate 
parts of the court system to work together.
67
 Those involved in the 
initial efforts agreed that it suddenly felt like all parts of the system 
were collaborating to accomplish change, and that there finally was a 
meaningful opportunity to fix a very broken system.
68
 Nevertheless, 
even in this early study, the authors warned that states needed to 
document both their efforts and the outcomes if they were going to be 
able to replicate successes and address challenges.
69
 Two years later, 
the same authors were asked to determine whether the state CIP 
efforts were even capable of evaluation.
70
 Their 2003 feasibility 
report provided the first real insight into how difficult it would be to 
assess these reform efforts: CIP funding had let a thousand flowers 
bloom—state and local initiatives—without asking states to keep 
track of the outcomes in any rigorous fashion.
71
 A range of creative 
and perhaps effective projects were being piloted with almost no way 
to measure whether they were working or could be replicated.
72
 After 
 
 66. Id. at 40–44. 
 67. See id. at 42. Ironically, by 2005, the federal government was mandating collaboration 
as a condition for receiving CIP funding. Program Instruction from Admin. for Children & 
Families to Highest State Courts of Appeal (June 15, 2006), available at http://www.acf.hhs. 
gov/programs/cb/laws_policies/policy/pi/2006/pi0605.htm. The CIP grant instructions noted 
that ―‗[m]eaningful, ongoing collaboration‘ means that the courts and State child welfare 
agencies will identify and work toward shared goals and activities.‖ Id.  
 68. In New York State, The Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children, 
chaired by former Chief Judge Kaye, held a conference in 1998 to energize Family Court 
judges about the CIP reform efforts in New York. The high point of the conference was an 
inspirational speech by former Judge Nancy Salyers about her efforts to reform the Chicago 
Family Court. See N.Y. STATE PERMANENT JUDICIAL COMM‘N ON JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 15 YEAR REPORT (2006), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/justicefor 
children/pdf/Final%20Booklet%20to%20Print.pdf.  
 69. Bell 1999, supra note 63, at 43. 
 70. JAMES BELL ASSOCS., FEASIBILITY OF EVALUATING THE STATE COURT 
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM vi (2003), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/statecip/volume 
one.pdf [hereinafter ―Bell 2003‖]. 
 71. ―Through the site visits, a group of diverse and innovative court reform activities were 
identified. All stakeholders believed their programs had vastly improved legal processes for 
children and families, yet most had little or no data to measure their impact.‖ Bell 2003, supra 
note 70, at vi. In fact, it would not be until 2006 that ACF finally would issue program 
instructions requiring states to include evaluative measures in their CIP grant proposals. See 
Program Instruction, supra note 67. 
 72. Bell 2003, supra note 70, at vi. 
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almost ten years of funding, this 2003 report was the first serious 
attempt to generate systematic knowledge.
73
  
2. Analysis of CIP Studies 
I am not suggesting that we have not been told—in Professor 
Kahn‘s words—what is being done. A CIP-funded industry has 
emerged over the last fifteen years to assure us that systematic 
knowledge about how to reform family court has been developed. 
States have created commissions, used administrative arms of the 
judiciary, and drawn on national projects developed specifically to 
provide technical assistance or to assess CIP efforts.
74
 Thousands of 
pages of information have been produced, generating powerful ideas 
and possibly improving family court outcomes. But when the analysis 
of these efforts is examined carefully, significant instances of our 
failure ―not to be fooled and not to fool anyone else‖ are uncovered.75 
For example, the 2003 feasibility study concluded that having a 
review of state projects at certain moments in time would provide a 
broader context for the more in-depth evaluations that were 
proposed.
76
 In 2007, the first ―snapshot‖ review was published.77 
 
 73. Bell 2003 was explicit in its recognition that important information could be gathered 
from a range of CIP sites but that rigorous evaluative techniques could only be used in limited 
sites and that other, less rigorous processes would have to suffice for other sites. Id. at 35. 
Nevertheless, Bell 2003 was optimistic that the combination of evaluations would result in 
providing ―valuable information on the process of reform and its effectiveness.‖ Id. at 36. 
 74. See, e.g., National Child Welfare Resource Center on Legal and Judicial Issues, Child 
Welfare Court Improvement, http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/courtimp.html (last visited Nov. 
5, 2009); National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Permanency Planning for 
Children Department, http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/view/82/146/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). In 
New York, that role was undertaken by the Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for 
Children. See New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children, About 
the Commission, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/justiceforchildren/index.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2009).  
 75. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 55. 
 76. Bell 2003, supra note 71, at 45. The current federal CIP evaluation plan that 
developed out of the feasibility study includes synthesizing the previously unavailable state 
evaluations as well as three specific site studies. Id. at 47. Unfortunately, there is no set date for 
the evaluation—synthesis. See U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE NAT‘L 
EVALUATION OF THE COURT IMPROVEMENT PROG., REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF STATE 
REASSESSMENTS, http://www.pal-tech.com/cip/reassessments.cfm (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
 77. THE NAT‘L EVALUATION OF THE COURT IMPROVEMENT PROG., SYNTHESIS OF 2005 
COURT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM REFORM AND ACTIVITIES (2007), http://www.pal-tech.com/ 
cip/files/FirstSynthesis.pdf [hereinafter ―2007 Snapshot‖]. The CIP Program Officer, Emily 
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Whether the 2007 Snapshot will provide that broader context cannot 
be determined until the proposed evaluations are complete.
78
 In the 
meantime, the Snapshot is the single most important federal 
document on the current state of CIP, and the most likely to be read 
by state courts. According to Emily Cooke, the CIP project officer, 
the Snapshot is not intended to ―assess the quality or impact of CIP 
reforms.‖79 Yet the report culminates in a chapter entitled, ―Successes 
Attributable to State CIP Programs.‖80 The authors then list a 
surprising number of accomplishments that state CIP coordinators 
attribute to CIP, including improved representation of parties, 
enhanced collaboration among stakeholders in the system, and 
improved quality of hearings.
81
 Yet, the forty-nine CIP reports that 
are reviewed allow the Snapshot‘s authors to determine what the 
states have done in recent years, rather than—as Professor Kahn 
would demand—what they have accomplished.82 That information 
was not available.
83
 Accordingly, the Snapshot perpetuates a false 
sense of accomplishment, which ultimately undermines our ability to 
 
Cooke, stated that the report was intended ―to provide a snapshot of State priorities as described 
in the fiscal year 2005 annual State program reports.‖ Id. at 2.  
 78. Those evaluations of three specific court improvement sites are intended to apply the 
most rigorous qualitative and quantitative analysis possible. A brief description of that analysis 
exists but no public date is set for completion. See U.S. DEP‘T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
THE NAT‘L EVALUATION OF THE COURT IMPROVEMENT PROG., REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF 
EXISTING COURT REFORM EVALUATIONS, http://www.pal-tech.com/cip/evaluations.cfm (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 79. 2007 Snapshot, supra note 77, at 2. 
 80. Id. at 42. These ―successes‖ fall into two categories: the court reform projects, which 
have affected the central goals of the 1997 federal Adoption and the Safe Families Act 
(―ASFA‖) to improve child safety, permanency, and well-being; or, more generally, the major 
accomplishments of CIP identified over the life of the project. Id. at 42–43. 
 81. Id. at 43–45. The Snapshot also lists ASFA-related accomplishments. Id. at 42–43. 
 82. Grimes, supra note 24. 
 83. The 2003 feasibility report already had established that even the twelve CIP sites most 
promising to evaluate had ―little or no data to measure their impact.‖ Bell 2003, supra note 71, 
at 19. Moreover, the 2007 Snapshot is supposed to contain the following information on each 
reform activity: description of the activity; its purpose, scope, and target population; reform 
implementation date; whether it was undertaken as part of a Program Improvement Plan in 
response to the state‘s Child and Family Services Review (CFSR); whether the reform is 
expected to impact the ASFA outcomes of expediting permanency, maintaining child safety, 
and facilitating child well-being; use and type of funding—other than CIP—that supports the 
reform; and whether any evaluation of the reform has taken place (identified evaluations are 
requested). See 2007 Snapshot, supra note 77. Despite this clear mandate for information, the 
2007 Snapshot does not contain this site-specific information. 
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bring a critical eye to CIP and create systematic knowledge about 
family court reform.  
The Snapshot is based on three sources of information: 2005 state 
CIP reports submitted to the Children‘s Bureau;84 the American Bar 
Association‘s National Child Welfare Center of Legal and Judicial 
Issues report, Court Improvement Progress Report 2005 (a summary 
of state CIP efforts to enhance their court dependency processes); and 
telephone discussions with the state CIP coordinators or their 
designees.
85
  
For the 2005 CIP reports, states were asked to report rather than 
evaluate their efforts for the year.
86
 The relationship between the 
federal CIP funder and the states dictates the states‘ responses.87 
States were not asked to analyze their work, and they accordingly did 
not report their analysis. Instead, they reported their efforts in the best 
possible light. The study team then adjusted its methodology per 
phone calls to CIP staff, inquiring about which reforms were most 
effective and major accomplishments.
88
 In light of these steps, it is 
well to recall Howard Gardner‘s caveat that public commitment to 
ideas makes us resistant to changing our minds.
89
 The state CIP staff 
is employed to facilitate and support the goals of the CIP. Once such 
a commitment is made, we cannot expect the staff to undermine it by 
changing their opinions or challenging earlier assertions.
90
 They are 
not being deceptive; they are remembering, describing, and 
confirming what is consistent with their earlier experience or 
commitment.
91
 Here, the staff was not asked to analyze the reports, 
but only to embellish them. They were not asked to prove that the 
reforms were working, and they did not. 
 
 84. The Children‘s Bureau is a division of the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services Administration for Children and Families, which administers the CIP funds. 
National Child Welfare Resource Center on Legal and Judicial Issues, http://www.abanet.org/ 
child/rclji/home.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
 85. According to the Snapshot, the forty-nine CIP reports describe ―CIP-funded and/or 
initiated activities the states were implementing in FFY 2005.‖ 2007 Snapshot, supra note 77, 
at 14. 
 86. Id. at 2. 
 87. See TILLY, WHY?, supra note 44, at 15. 
 88. 2007 Snapshot, supra note 77, at 5, 14–15. 
 89. GARDNER, supra note 37, at 57. 
 90. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 55, at 23. 
 91. Id. at 37, 70. 
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The other source of information was the American Bar 
Association‘s National Child Welfare Resource Center of Legal and 
Judicial Issues (Center) report summarizing—in its words—the 
―progress‖ made by the states.92 Like the CIP, the Center is funded by 
the Children‘s Bureau. The Center has collated promising practices 
from around the country so that states interested in reforming their 
systems can access these descriptions easily on the Center‘s website 
or in published reports.
93
 The Center also provides technical 
assistance to the states for their CIP projects, and deserves credit for 
creating technical advice for states to evaluate their work.
94
 However, 
along with other organizations deeply involved in the CIP, such as 
the Permanency Project of the National Council of Juvenile and 
Family Court Judges, the Center publicly applauds state CIP reforms 
while also serving as a paid consultant to states regarding those 
reform efforts.
95
 This makes it very difficult for these organizations to 
critique the CIP projects publicly. While dedicated and talented 
people work at these organizations, the public commitment to the CIP 
along with the interdependence among these organizations, the 
federal government funders, and the state CIPs makes it very difficult 
for them to critique the states and, perhaps, the organizations‘ own 
potential failure in securing effective reform.
96
 My concern that the 
process used to create the Snapshot undermines efforts to create 
systemic knowledge is reflected in the actual report. 
The Snapshot transports one back to the heady beginning of CIP. 
With charts and graphs, the Snapshot provides a sweeping picture of 
 
 92. National Child Welfare Resource Center on Legal and Judicial Issues, National 
Summary, http://www.abanet.org/abanet/child/natsum/nationalcat.cfm?catid=14&subid=0 (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
 93. National Child Welfare Resource Center on Legal and Judicial Issues, National Court 
Improvement Progress Report and Catalog, http://www.abanet.org/abanet/child/home.cfm (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 94. National Child Welfare Resource Center on Legal and Judicial Issues, National 
Summary, supra note 92; National Child Welfare Resource Center on Legal and Judicial Issues, 
Technology, http://www.abanet.org/child/rclji/technology.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 95. See, e.g., National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Frequently Asked 
Questions About National Council Model Courts, http://www.ncjfcj.org/content/blogcategory/ 
117/156/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).  
 96. For a general discussion of how cognitive dissonance affects our ability to critique 
what we are doing and enhances our self-justification, see TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 55, 
at 11–39. 
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the many projects being attempted around the country.
97
 The 
Snapshot identifies twelve categories of activities for the projects, 
asks the CIP coordinators to prioritize their reforms, and ultimately 
compares them to the projects and priorities identified in the 1999 
Review and Analysis.
98
 While the Snapshot intends to convey a sense 
of deeper commitment and expanded activity since 1999, it also 
invokes many unanswered questions. For example, why do states that 
identified priorities in 1999 continue to identify those same 
priorities? Have the reforms simply not yet been achieved, or are they 
unattainable? Why do training and judicial expertise remain near the 
top of the priority list?
99
 Is training the best use of funds, or does staff 
turnover always require training funds? In other words, is increasing 
training funds a long-term reform solution, or a necessary component 
of judicial administration? If CIP funding were eliminated, would 
judicial training end? Each category should be examined by asking 
these types of questions; however, the Snapshot did not. Even a list of 
challenges to accomplishing the reforms would acknowledge how 
difficult it is to achieve systemic change. The Snapshot leaves us with 
the sense that these projects are working and should be replicated. 
This misleading sense can—and likely will—cause future problems.  
IV. THE ROLE OF FAMILY COURT 
This Article has posed a challenge to the dominant reform 
paradigm currently being implemented. I have suggested ways to test 
that paradigm that extend beyond the current approach and ask how 
 
 97. 2007 Snapshot, supra note 77, at 22–24. 
 98. The twelve categories of activities identified in the 2007 Snapshot, in order of reform 
priority, are as follows: ―Improved Representation of Parties‖; ―Multidisciplinary Training and 
Education‖; ―Judicial Expertise Concerning Child Abuse & Neglect‖; ―Communication and 
Collaboration Among Court Participants‖; ―Notification and Treatment of Parties‖; ―Timeliness 
and Efficiency of the Court Process‖; ―Quality of Hearings‖; ―Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Programs‖; ―Statewide Management Information Systems‖; ―Additional Research and 
Evaluation‖; ―Legislation and Court Rules‖; and ―Local Case Tracking.‖ 2007 Snapshot, supra 
note 77, at 22–36. These categories reflect generally the categories applied in Bell 1999, but 
seriously conflate the categorization developed by the ABA National Child Welfare Resource 
Center on Legal and Judicial Issues (ABA NCWCLJI) that allow for more nuanced analysis. 
Moreover, the Snapshot inflates the activities by identifying them in multiple categories. Id. at 
16.  
 99. Id. at 25–26.  
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our own experiences, perspectives, and place within the system affect 
not only our ability to open our minds to creative solutions, but also 
to recognize where we have failed and how individual and group 
thinking limits our ability to change. We must be willing to subject 
our ideas and models to rigorous analysis rather than relying on 
anecdotal stories. We must commit to collecting information and 
analyzing it. We must be open to understanding the part each of us 
plays in the system being analyzed. Then, we might know whether 
some of these innovations are worth keeping. Yet, ultimately, a more 
foundational question must still be answered while we pursue court 
reform: What is the role of family court?  
Twenty-seven years ago, Edward Mulvey asked whether we had 
created reasonable goals for family court.
100
 He wrote that ―the 
question of whether the court‘s attempt [to resolve family problems] 
will produce gain far outweighing harm is unanswered although often 
assumed.‖101 I posed a similar question at the beginning of this 
Article, asking: What value does the family court add when it 
intervenes in a family‘s life?102 Both questions challenge the 
assumption that a court is the right mechanism to resolve family 
problems. They also raise the possibility that court intervention may 
prove more harmful than helpful.
103
 These questions are deeply 
rooted in ―the fundamental right of parents to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children,‖104 and in 
our failure to test whether this far more limited role for the family 
court is more effective than the problem-solving court.  
A. Testing the Due Process, Value-Added Paradigm 
Two model programs could be analyzed to test the effectiveness 
of a more limited due process court. Both models start with the 
 
 100. Mulvey, supra note 21. 
 101. Id. at 53 (citations omitted).  
 102. See supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text. 
 103. The court must do more than identify the existence of a risk of serious harm. Rather, a 
court must weigh, in the factual setting before it, whether the imminent risk to the child can be 
mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal. It must balance that risk against the harm 
removal might bring, and it must determine factually which course is in the child's best 
interests. Nicholson v. Scopetta, 3 N.Y.3d 357, 378 (N.Y. 2003). 
 104. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
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premise that families must be central to creating and controlling the 
solutions to their problems, and that court intervention can be 
eliminated or significantly diminished to the betterment of the 
families.  
1. Eliminating Status Offenses 
The first model would test whether we could eliminate family 
court jurisdiction entirely for cases involving youth status offenses. 
That is, the family court no longer would be the place where families, 
schools, and law enforcement come when children run away, ignore 
curfews, befriend troublemakers, use drugs, or skip school. In 2004, 
over 159,000 status offense cases were processed in courts with 
juvenile jurisdiction, a thirty-nine percent increase from 1995.
105
 
During the same period, the percentage of youth adjudicated as status 
offenders nearly doubled.
106
 In 2004, over 12,000 youths were 
displaced from their homes.
107
 Remember, these youths were not 
charged with any crime. Rather, families and community agencies 
have turned to the family court to help them deal, predominantly, 
with the problems of adolescents.
108
  
Since the beginning of the decade, the Vera Institute of Justice 
(―Vera‖) has been developing new programs to assist families with 
adolescents in crisis. Rather than parents, schools, and police taking 
these youth to court for proceedings that could result in detention, 
probation, and out-of-home placement, they are helping state and 
county authorities to develop immediate, family-focused alternatives 
to court intervention.
109
 These new programs are based on earlier 
studies that found promising results when families received 
immediate, community-based help.
110
 While status-offense 
 
 105. ANNE L. STAHL ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT 
STATISTICS 2003–2004 70 (2007), http://www.cjrs.gov/pdffiles1/opjjdp/218587.pdf.  
 106. Id. at 82. 
 107. Id. at 84. 
 108. See Spinak, Romancing the Court, supra note 12, at 265. 
 109. SARA MOGULESCU & GASPAR CARO, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, MAKING COURT THE 
LAST RESORT: A NEW FOCUS FOR SUPPORTING FAMILIES IN CRISIS 2 (2008), http://verastage. 
forumone.com/download?file=1796/status_offender_finalPDF.pdf.  
 110. Id. at 2, 6–7, 12. See also TINA CHIU & SARA MOGULESCU, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, 
CHANGING THE STATUS QUO FOR STATUS OFFENDERS: NEW YORK STATE‘S EFFORTS TO 
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jurisdiction is a classic example of using the family court as a 
problem-solving court for families, projects conducted by Vera have 
shown that diversion from court is far more effective in engaging the 
youth and family in needed services. Moreover, using a court-based 
model may actually divert attention and resources away from 
valuable family-based services.
111
 In Vera‘s most recent study, 
examples from Florida, Connecticut, and upstate New York indicate 
that keeping children out of court is improving family stability, 
outcomes for children, and financial burdens on the state.
112
 If these 
trends continue, eliminating status-offense jurisdiction may be 
possible. It would also embolden us to consider whether court 
jurisdiction could be eliminated or reduced by employing effective 
diversionary programs in other case matters. 
2. Providing Lawyer Teams 
My second proposal is to provide more lawyers in family court—
not just any lawyers, but lawyers who work in offices with an 
interdisciplinary approach; specifically, lawyers who work with 
social workers and parent peer advocates. This team would be 
assigned, for example, to represent parents before a petition is filed, 
at the point where the child protective agency determines that it is 
likely to bring the case to court. The parent would have a confidential 
working relationship with the team, who would represent the parent 
from pre-petition through the completion of the case, which ranges 
from never filing to final appeal. Central to this model is the family‘s 
ability to access confidential assistance including expertise in law, 
social services, and life. The parent advocate who can draw on her 
own experience in proposing solutions may be as important to the 
case as the social worker who accesses services or the lawyer who 
gets the case dismissed. The key difference between this model and 
 
SUPPORT TROUBLED TEENS 1–2 (2004), http://verastage.forumone.com/download?file=265/ 
IIb%2Bchanging%2Bthe%2Bstatus%2Bquo.pdf. 
 111. See, e.g., JESSE SOUWEINE & AJAY KHASHU, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, CHANGING THE 
PINS SYSTEM IN NEW YORK: A STUDY OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF RAISING THE AGE LIMIT FOR 
PERSONS IN NEED OF SUPERVISION (PINS) 8 (2001), http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/legal/ 
legislation/pins/vera_pins_report2001.pdf. 
 112. MOGULESCU & CARO, supra note 109, at 5–8, 9–12.  
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the problem-solving court is that the family is not relying on the court 
to create and monitor the solution; the parent‘s advocacy team is 
helping the family do that.
113
 Outcomes for families served by this 
model could then be compared to families who were not; if the 
outcomes of this model are better than the outcomes of unserved 
families, this model could be expanded. In New York City, where 
this model was recently implemented, the preliminary statistics are 
quite remarkable. During the pilot phase, in cases where the team was 
assigned before filing, ninety-five percent of the children served 
avoided foster care; if a petition already had been filed, children who 
went into foster care averaged 4.5 months in care compared to the 
state average of four years.
114
 When funding was expanded in 2007 to 
include about half of the cases filed in Manhattan, the model was 
changed to apply only when a petition is filed. Nevertheless, children 
spend, on average, seventy-three percent less time in foster care than 
other children in the city and state, and in half of the cases, the 
children never entered foster care at all.
115
 Numbers like these 
suggest that the model could significantly diminish the need for court 
intervention, allowing the court to focus on cases in which it would 
add value by protecting the legal rights of children and parents. 
These models present a different vision of the court and they can 
be tested. If they are effective, they can challenge the problem-
 
 113. Called Community Advocacy Teams (CAT), the model was developed by the Center 
for Family Representation (CFR), which has been described as: 
[A] groundbreaking, nonprofit law and policy organization whose mission is to 
guarantee that every family that can live safely together has the chance to do so. We 
assist families when the combination of poverty and a crisis—one borne of anything 
from addiction to inadequate day care—may lead to separation and a child being 
placed in foster care. We provide free legal services to parents in crisis, train 
practitioners in the child welfare and court systems on best practices to support 
families and provide leadership at the city, state and national level on how best to 
strengthen families. 
Center for Family Representation, http://www.cfrny.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). In the 
interest of full disclosure, please note that I was the founding Chair of the Board of CFR. 
 114. Center for Family Representation, New Model of Legal Services—Community 
Advocacy Teams, http://www.cfrny.org/new_legal.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2009). 
 115. Id. The remarkable achievements of the pre-2007 results should encourage states to 
fund pre-petition representation to help avoid family disruption, stays in foster care, and lengthy 
family court proceedings. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 31:11 
 
 
solving paradigm with an alternative vision; if they are not, much 
more work will be required to reach a solution.  
CONCLUSION 
The questions I posed at the beginning of this Article ask that 
family court reformers be willing to subject their reform efforts to 
rigorous analysis and reflection. I presented those questions in the 
context of analyzing the dominant problem-solving paradigm that 
pervades current family court reform efforts. In doing so, I have 
begun to show that these efforts have not yet been proven to be 
effective and thus worth adopting more broadly. We have allowed 
ourselves to be ―satisficed‖ with the reforms rather than uncovering 
their true measure of success or failure. That is because we have not 
yet framed our questions differently, moved beyond conventional 
reasons for our actions, scrutinized the stories on which we have 
relied, or subjected our efforts to rigorous study in order to hold 
ourselves accountable for our efforts. Until we take those steps, we 
fool ourselves at great human and financial cost. 
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